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THE MEMING OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS 
Jamal Greene* 
Substantive due process is notoriously regarded as a textual 
contradiction, but it is in fact redundant. The word "due" cannot 
be honored except by inquiring into the relationship between the 
nature and scope of the deprived interest and the process- whether 
fudicial, administrative, or legislative-that attended the 
deprivation. The treatment of substantive due process as an 
oxymoron is what this Essay calls a constitutional menze, an idea 
that replicates through imitation within the constitutional culture 
rather than (necessarily) through logical persuasion. We might 
even call the idea a "precedent," in the nature of other legal 
propositions within a common law system. This Essay explores the 
intellectual and social history of the substantive-due-process-as-
contradiction meme and argues that it is often appropriate for 
fudges to rely upon such memes even ~{their underlying claims lack 
analytic integrity . .Judicial opinion writing in constitutional cases is 
best understood as an act of translation between the decisional 
process of the fudge and the representations necessary to validate 
the decision within the constitutional culture. 
INTRODUCTION 
Substantive due process is not a contradiction in terms.' 
Indeed, it is redundant. No inquiry into the propriety of some 
process-its "due"-ness-is or can be indifferent to the substance 
of the associated loss. Due process contemplates a rule of reason 
that calibrates the relation between, on one hand, the nature and 
* Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank Brandon 
Garrett, Risa Goluboff, Kent Greenawalt, Jill Hasday, Leslie Kendrick, Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Mark Walters, Ryan Williams, and workshop participants at Columbia Law 
School, Queen's University Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and 
William & Mary Law School for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
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scope of a deprivation and, on the other, the process that attends 
it.2 For some deprivations, a simple majority vote in the legislature 
and the signature of the executive is sufficient process; for others, 
more, even a constitutional amendment, may be required. It 
would beg the question to pronounce, tout court, that any 
particular legislative process is always constitutionally adequate. 
It would turn the word "due'' into surplus.3 
It has somehow become common ground across the 
ideological spectrum that a textual analysis of this sort fails. 4 
These days, the most damning charge against substantive due 
process is not that it gets the history wrong or that it unduly 
empowers judges, both of which might be accurate, but rather that 
it abuses the English language, which is not. Part of this Essay's 
project, then, is to shift the terrain on which the battle over the 
Due Process Clause is waged. Standing alone, the constitutional 
text supports substantive due process because the word 
substantive, to repeat, is redundant. Part I makes this case. It 
argues that neither "substantive'' nor "procedural" due process 
holds superior title to the phrase "due process of law" or, at the 
least, that staring at the Constitution contributes nothing to the 
argument.5 
2. See Mathews v. Eklridgc, 424 U.S. 31Y, 334 (1Y7n); Goldberg v. Kelly, 3!)7 U.S. 
254, 2n2-n3 ( tno). 
3. See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of 
!~awful Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2H3, 330 (2012) ("A procedure-only approach 
to due process cannot account for the meaning of the word 'due."'). 
4. See id. at 2X4 ("IFior decades it has been a commonplace of law schools that 
substantive due process is an oxymoron .... "). In addition to Ely, set:, for example, Ellis 
v. Hamilton, nnl) F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1YR2) (calling substantive due process ''the 
ubiquitous oxymoron"); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, XII (2010) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment) ("The notion that a constitutional 
provision that guarantees only 'process' before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or 
property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most 
casual user of words."); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM l)l (IYY7) 
("Now when you say those words 'substantive due process' over and over, you must sec ... 
that the phrase is incorrigibly self-contradictory."); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: 
DiscoverinK the Constitution, !)3 YALE L.J. 1013, 1071 (1YR4) (rdcning to "the awful 
oxymoron of substantive due process"); Steven G. Calabrcsi, Substantive Due Process 
After Gonzales v. Carhart, 10n MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1531 (200H) ("For me as an originalist, 
the very notion of substantive due process is an oxymoron."); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Does the Constitution Prescribe Rulesj(Jr Its Own Interpretation'!, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. X57, 
xn (200!)) (calling substantive due process a "made-up, atcxtual invention''). 
5. Debates over the conceptual difference between substance and process in the 
context of due process of law arc of long standing. For a flavor of the various positions, 
sec, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, IYX2 SUP. CT. REV. 
2016] MEMING OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 255 
It would be valuable enough to stop there. For as central as 
the Due Process Clause has been to constitutional law over the 
last century~ the inconsistency of Griswold v. Connecticut6 and its 
progeny with the constitutional text is no longer contested.7 As 
time has passed~ the weight of stare decisis has crowded out any 
affirmative textual argument in favor of ''substantive" due 
process. The Court itself said three decades ago in a unanimous 
opinion that substantiv.: due process is not suggested by the 
Constitution~s language and indeed ''is nothing more than the 
accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. "x This concession tends to stunt the 
growth of the doctrine and places supporters of particular 
constitutional rights-especially to sexual and reproductive 
autonomy- unnecessarily on the defensive. It also poses a 
dilemma for teachers of constitutional law~ who must indoctrinate 
into students a textual difference between "substantive" and 
"procedurar' due process that disappears on reflection. 
As Part II explains~ it was not always thus. Substantive due 
process was a phrase seldom used in constitutional law until at 
least the 1960s~ and its prominence rose dramatically in the 1980s 
when legal conservatives (and some liberals) began to lampoon it 
as a textual anomaly. It was not, as some would have it~ a careless 
Warren Court innovation~ repurposed from the Gilded Age and 
exposed for its absurdity after the rise of textual ism. In fact, from 
the dawn of the Fourteenth Amendment up until the Warren 
Court~ invocations of due process were frequently what we would 
now call "substantive" due process~ and attacks on the doctrine 
were not usually based on the Constitution's text, which is too 
vague to contradict much of anything. The term substantive due 
process was part of the rhetorical process that made Lochner v. 
New York an anticanonical precedent~ one that is repeatedly and 
(nearly) universally cited as an example of badly misguided 
X5. Whether or not there is a conceptual dillerencc, I do believe there is a practical 
differencc, as noted below. See Part I infra. 
6. 3X1 U.S.479(1965). 
7. This is true of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment Clauses. As this 
Essay focuses on the text rather than the history of the provisions, I usc the clauses 
interchangeably unless noted. For discussion of potential differences between the two 
clauses, sec Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 
YALE L.J. 40X (2010). 
X. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (19X5) (yuoting 
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,543-44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)). 
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constitutional decision making.9 Lochner's anticanonicity came 
about in the 1970s and flourished in the 1980s as part of the case 
against sexual privacy and abortion rights. Substantive due 
process was a phrase largely created by its enemies and attributed 
to its supporters in a strategic assault on particular Court 
decisions. 
Part III sorts out the implications of this story for the role of 
analytic integrity in the formation of constitutional arguments. 
Whether or not substantive due process Is logically a 
contradiction in terms, its status as an oxymoron has become what 
I call a constitutional meme. A me me is a cultural element- a 
word, an idea, a set of assumptions-whose growth and evolution 
are sometimes said to mimic genetic transmission. 10 A 
constitutional metne is one passed among and through 
generations of lawyers, scholars, and judges as the conventional 
wisdom of constitutional law. The wrongness of Lochner, the 
unamendability of the Constitution via Article V, the tiers of 
scrutiny framework, and the textual absurdity of substantive due 
process each exemplifies a constitutional meme. Each is an idea, 
a cluster of information, so deeply embedded that it is often stated 
without further proof or elaboration and resists 
counterargument. 11 
Constitutional memes are vital to constitutional law. We can 
understand constitutional law as a set of resources for making 
9. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011 ). 
10. See e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 215 (1976). 
11. Each of the examples noted in the text is notionally vulnerahk to 
counterargument. Lochner is consistent with a culture of rights, a concern for minority 
political representation, and (arguahly) the original understanding of the Due Process 
Clause. See Greene, supra note 9, at 417-22; see also DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, 
REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2012). The U.S. Constitution is infrequently amended in 
comparison to many in the world, see ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, & JAMES 
MEUON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009). hut it is far from 
ohvious whether this textual stahility is structurally determined or is instead a dynamic 
feature of the prevailing constitutional culture. See Tom Ginshurg & James Melton, noes 
the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges 
of Measuring Amendment [)if!iculty (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics, 
Working Paper No. 6X2, 2014); see also JOHN 0. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, 
0RIGINALISM AND TIIF GOOD CONSTITUTION 69-72 (2013) (arguing that the Article V 
amendment process has not heen too strict to prevent suhstantial political change). The 
descriptive imprecision of the tiers of scrutiny framework is well-known, see, e.g., James E. 
Fleming, "There Is Only One f_·qual Protection Clause": An Appreciation of Justice 
Stevens's /<,'qual Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2006), even as 
departures from the framework continue to form the hasis for criticism of the Court's 
work. See Russell K. Rohinson, UnelJUal Protection, 67 STAN. L. REV. 151 (2015). 
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constitutional arguments. Those resources fall within a limited 
number of domains-the text, historical materials, precedents, 
prudential arguments, and so forth. Close cases arise when 
advocates for divergent positions both have substantial resources 
to draw upon within these domains. Constitutional doctrine does 
not depend on which set of resources provides correct answers in 
some metaphysical sense; it depends on who successfully 
persuades judges and other legal officials who enjoy decision-
making authority. Invoking constitutional memes can help to 
persuade decision-makers by narrowing the ground of argument 
in ways that are favorable to one's position. 
Judges operate subject to ethical obligations extending 
beyond the need to persuade decision-makers, and that may 
temper their resort to memes that are rhetorically useful but false. 
But the epistemological structure of constitutional law does not 
permit constitutional judges to ignore altogether the demands of 
persuasion. They must, in effect, translate their decisions into a 
language susceptible to validation by the public that constitutional 
law ultimately serves. The act of translation can place a judge in 
the uncomfortable but unavoidable space between legal fictions 
and 1ies. 12 
Substantive due process is often defined but rarely with 
precision. John Hart Ely's quip that substantive due process is a 
contradiction in terms- "sort of like 'green pastel redness"' 13 -is 
as famous as anything ever said in a constitutional law 
monograph, but the ubiquity of the quip should raise suspicion as 
to its analytic clarity. 14 Ely describes his target as the view that the 
12. CJ JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS 141 (C.K. Og(.kn cd., 
1 t)32) ("What you have been doing by fiction ~could you, or could you not, have done it 
without the fiction? If not, your fiction is a wicked lie: if yes, a foolish one. Such is the 
dilemma. Lawyer! IE lscapc from it if you can."). 
13. ELY, supra note 1, at 1 X. 
14. Universal or ncar-universal assent is sometimes said to be a measure of truth. 
See John Finn is, Natural Law and the Ethics of Discourse, 43 AM. J. JURIS . ."i3, ."i4 (1 t)t)X) 
(describing the Platonic viewpoint). Often this claim assumes not only some form of 
rational deliberation and reflective judgment on the part of participants but it also may 
assume that individuals arc more likely than not to be right. See H .. .lcne Landcmorc, 
Collective Wisdom: Old and New, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND 
MECHANISMS 2 (H .. .lcnc Landcmorc & Jon Elster cds., 2012). CJ .lAMES SliROWIECKI, 
THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW 
COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS 
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Due Process Cia use "incorporat[ es] a general mandate to review 
the substantive merits of legislative and other governmental 
action." 15 Justice Scalia, the most prominent modern critic of the 
doctrine, writes: 
By its inescapable terms, [the Due Process Clause J guarantees 
only process. Property can he taken hy the state; liberty can he 
taken; even life can he taken; hut not without the process that 
our traditions require-notably, a validly enacted law and a fair 
trial. To say otherwise is to abandon textualism, and to render 
democratically adopted texts mere springboards for judicial 
lawmaking. 16 
In the same vein, Robert Bork insists that the Due Process Clause 
"is simply a requirement that the substance of any law be applied 
to a person through fair procedures by any tribunal hearing a case 
[and] says nothing whatever about what the substance of the law 
must be." 17 Laurence Tribe writes that the text of the provision 
"suggests a guarantee that, whatever the substance of the rules of 
conduct government promulgates, those rules may not be brought 
to bear on any person so as to deprive that person of life, liberty, 
or property without fair procedures- such as a hearing before a 
neutral decision maker." IX Richard Posner has called substantive 
due process a "durable oxymoron" whereunder "'persons harmed 
by state regulation [may] complain that the regulation is so 
unreasonable a deprivation of life, liberty, or property that it is 
unconstitutional even if adopted and applied in conformity with 
the most rigorous procedural safeguards." 19 
(2004)). Unanimity may rclkct a lack of textured analysis or incomplete theorization. See 
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized AJ.;reements, lOX HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). 
The Talmudic puzzle that unanimity on the Sanhedrin led to acquittal seems to adopt some 
version of this reasoning-a unanimous verdict suggests a trouhling lack of independent 
judgment. See Emphraim Glatt, The Unanimous Verdict AccordinJ.; to the Tulmud: Ancient 
l~aw ProvidinJ.; Insight Into Modern !~ega! Theory, 3 PACF INT'L L. REV. ONLINE 316,324-
25 (2013). 
15. Ely, supra note 1 at 15. 
16. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-l~aw System, in A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 24-25 (Amy Gutmann 
ed.,1997). 
17. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 31 (1990). 
1?\. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1332-33 (3d ed. 
2000). 
19. Ill. Psychological Ass'n. v. Falk, X1X F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 19X7); accord Ellis 
v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 19X2) (calling substantive due process "the 
uhiq uitous oxymoron .. ). 
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An example may help to diagnose the inadequacy of these 
formulations as criticisms of substantive due process. The Court's 
recent, controversial expansion of the Due Process Clause to 
condemn prohibitions on same-sex marriage supplies a ready 
hypothetical. Let us turn back the clock to the day before the 
Court's decision in Ohergefell v. l!odges. 20 Suppose a county 
registrar refuses to issue a marriage license solely on the ground 
that the two people who wish to marry are both men. In this 
particular state, the state constitution defines marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman. The couple sues, arguing that an 
agent of the state has deprived them of liberty without due process 
of law in violation of the federal Constitution. According to Ely, 
Scalia, Bork, Tribe, and Posner- an august, eclectic bunch- this 
claim does violence to the text (a charge that would bother some 
more than others). 
But why? Getting married is a liberty, indeed one previously 
recognized as fundamental by the Supreme Court,21 and denial of 
a marriage license constitutes a deprivation of that liberty. The 
denial was effected by a process of law, namely a state 
constitutional amendment. And the couple's claim is that this 
process is not the one "due" to them in light of the significance of 
the deprived interest. A more rigorous legal process-for 
example, a federal constitutional ban on same-sex marriage-
would have extinguished the couple's constitutional claim. A less 
rigorous but categorically distinct legal process- a determination 
by a Supreme Court majority that the state had sufficient reason 
to deny the license and that its denial bore a sufficient relationship 
to that interest-also would have extinguished the couple's claim. 
As it turns out, the state's process for effecting its deprivation of 
liberty was held to be inadequate-i.e., not due-and hence the 
availability of same-sex marriage is now the law of the land. 
On this view, substantive due process is not, as Ely would 
have it, a mandate to review the "merits" of governmental action 
but is instead a mandate to determine which of a long menu of 
procedural boxes fits a particular kind of state deprivation. Justice 
Scalia is right that the text speaks of process, but in adding that 
''process" means a "validly enacted law and a fair trial," he 
20. 135 S. Ct. 25K4 (2015). 
21. See Turner v. Safley, 4K2 lJ .S. 7K, 95 ( 19K7); Zahlocki v. Rcdhail, 434 U.S. 374 
( 197K). But see Oherge(ell, D5 S. Ct. at 2635-37 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Due Process Clause docs not protect positive lihcrtics). 
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concedes that the clause requires judges to determine which laws 
are validly enacted and which trials are fair. These are substantive 
questions. Accordingly, Judge Bork cannot mean that the Due 
Process Clause requires only that the substance of ''any" law be 
applied through fair procedures; he would insist, I assume, that 
the clause further require, as Justice Scalia implies, that those laws 
be enacted by constitutionally competent lawmakers. And who is 
competent to enact a particular law must depend, in part, on what 
the law does. Likewise, Professor Tribe skips a step when he takes 
"the rules of conduct government promulgates" as given rather 
than as the outcome of a process whose fairness must be matched 
to the nature and scope of the deprived life, liberty, or property. 
Finally, it is simply wrong, pace Judge Posner, to say that a 
substantive due process claimant thinks no procedural safeguard 
would be adequate to justify the deprivation, since a valid 
constitutional amendment or a law passed in satisfaction of strict 
judicial scrutiny would suffice (even if they are not the relief the 
claimant seeks). Put another way, the claim is not that a 
challenged deprivation may not occur regardless of the process 
that attends it; it is that the deprivation may not occur in light of 
the process that effected it. 
Conceived in this way, it is easy to see how due process may 
be conceptualized along a loose (and perhaps overlapping) 
spectrum from what we tend to see as its procedural to its 
substantive elements. This is so because multiple ambiguities 
enable a diversity of "processes" to satisfy the textual commands 
of the Due Process Clause.22 For a relatively minor deprivation, 
such as the $23.50 in hobby materials allegedly lost by Nebraska 
corrections officials in Parratt v. Taylor,23 due process of law might 
be no more than the availability of a state tort system. For a more 
serious deprivation, such as the loss of life-sustaining but 
statutorily defined welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly,24 a pre-
deprivation administrative hearing is "due." For marginal 
deprivations of certain fundamental rights, ordinary, non-
arbitrary legislation might be enough,25 but for absolute 
22. Eastcrhrook, supra note 5, at 90 ("The language of the I Due Process 
Clauses! .... could mean just ahout anything."). 
23. 451 U.S. 527,529 (19XI). 
24. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
25. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 42X, 433-34 (1992); Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. X33, X74 (IY92) (Joint Op.); Zahlocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 3X7 
(197X). 
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deprivations, the Constitution must be amended or the legislation 
must be subject to review by an independent adjudicator-a panel 
of judges-employing certain standards of necessity and fit. 26 
The path from procedural to substantive requirements for 
legislative or judicial review is not necessarily linear in respect to 
the severity of the deprivation. Bert Taylor, Jr. could likely have 
raised a substantive due process objection had his $23.50 in hobby 
materials been deprived intentionally rather than negligently,27 
but John Kelly had no substantive entitlement to intentionally 
deprived benefits that had kept him from homelessness.2s Still, the 
language of "fundamental" rights as the trigger for substantive 
due process suggests that strict scrutiny or constitutional 
amendment are the bulwarks against deprivations that are 
categorically more substantial than the ordinary liberty and 
property interests that trigger procedural due process protection. 
Claims that substantive due process doctrine describes an 
approach to a set of rights whose deprivation is never allowed, no 
matter the process,2Y apply only to absolute, non-derogable 
rights. 30 It is possible that such rights exist in the American 
system- the right against genocide, say31 - but the steady assault 
on substantive due process does not have these kinds of jus co gens 
norms in mind. 
Two overlapping objections deserve elaboration. First, there 
is a pleading issue. A procedural due process claim typically prays 
for procedural protection to attach to the complained of 
deprivation. A substantive due process claim does not typically 
2fl. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Eke. Bd., 553 U.S. IKI, IKlJ (200K); Zahlocki, 434 U.S. 
at 3KK. 
27. Indeed, though Parrall was decided as a procedural due process case, Richard 
Fallon has argued that hecause Taylor complained that the state lacked adequate reasons 
for affecting the loss of his hohhy materials, the underlying grievance was hetter 
understood in suhstantive due process terms. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion 
Ahout Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COUJM. L. REV. 309, 
341-44 (1993); see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 552-53 (Powell, J., concurring in the result) 
(noting that the Court's holding that there had heen a deprivation in a constitutional sense 
raises the possihility that the state violated suhstantive due process). 
2K. See Dandridge v. Williams, 3lJ7 U.S. 471, 477-7K (llJ70). 
2lJ. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 2lJ2, 302 (l<J<J3). 
30. See Peter J. Ruhin, Square PeKS and Round Holes: Suhstantive I>ue Process, 
Procedural Due Process, and the Bill ofRiKhts, 103 COLUM. L. REV. K33, KK2 (2003). Even 
this is dehatahlc, since the word "due" could arguahly contemplate that for certain 
deprivations, no process could justify them. 
31. See RESTATF~MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
* 702(a) & cmt. n. 
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pray for a constitutional amendment or for strict judicial scrutiny 
and no more. The crux of the complaint is that the deprivation 
should be voided: conditional relief giving the jurisdiction the 
opportunity to amend the Constitution would be not just 
procedurally odd but would greatly displease the plaintiff. The 
sense in which a claim is substantive rather than procedural in 
nature pertains to the relief the plaintiff seeks, not the relief that 
would eliminate his cause of action. The plaintiff's substantive due 
process complaint directs the courfs energy towards whether the 
law is a proper one, which is an unmistakably substantive 
question, distinguishable from questions of notice, an opportunity 
to be heard, the availability of counsel, and burdens of production 
and persuasion. 
Any claim that substantive and procedural due process do 
not involve distinct analysis would need to meet this objection, 
but that is not this Part's claim. The distinction between 
substantive and procedural due process is intelligible, even if 
there is significant ambiguity on the margins. A due process 
violation requires that the asserted life, liberty, or property 
interest pass some threshold of importance and that it be deprived 
without crossing some other threshold of regularity or consistency 
with the way in which meaningfully similar rights are deprived. 
Substantive due process claims focus on the first of these 
thresholds while procedural claims focus on the second, and in 
both cases it is typically assumed that the other threshold has been 
crossed. Thus, these argument types are indeed distinct, and 
constitutional lawyers, judges, and scholars tend to know them 
when they see them. The claim of this Part is simply that the same 
text- "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law" -accommodates both 
argument types. 
A second objection to the analysis in this Part is grounded in 
the difficulty in severing textual argument from doctrine and 
history. The hypothetical substantive due process claim that 
opens this Part seems to track the words of the Due Process 
Clause and, if successful, vindicates the couple's substantive 
interest in marrying each other. But lawyers, especially those 
trained in common law systems, will immediately, indeed 
instinctively, see a problem with this proposed reconciliation. 
Some might argue that neither a constitutional amendment nor 
judicial application of strict scrutiny counts as a "process" within 
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the meaning of the term "due process of law." The processes the 
Due Process Clause contemplates are those such as notice of 
adverse claims, an opportunity to be heard before a neutral 
decisionmaker, with the benefit of counsel and certain evidentiary 
protections, and so forth. Perhaps a handful of those lawyers will 
allow that the Due Process Clause might be concerned as well 
with the legislative procedures attending a challenged law, or to 
the process of judicial review itself. But in that case, the kinds of 
infirmities that would make these processes "undue" are not what 
our hypothetical has in mind. An ''undue" legislative process is 
one that, say, lacks a quorum, operates under a non-majoritarian 
voting rule, or includes unelected legislators.32 An "undue" 
judicial review process is one conducted by a biased or (literally) 
incompetent judge.33 The notion that the process of ordinary 
lawmaking is not "due" because an interest is sufficiently 
fundamental to require a process of constitutional amendment, or 
that the process of rational basis judicial review is not "due" 
because the interest at stake requires strict scrutiny, will strike the 
common lawyer as casuistic. 
Whatever the virtues of this effort to recover a textual 
argument against substantive due process, it does not rely on the 
text, at least not in a way that Ely's joke has the resources to 
describe. For illumination, consider an example borrowed from 
Lon Fuller, which he in turn borrowed from John Austin. 34 Austin 
puzzled over the erstwhile English legal fiction, expounded by 
Blackstone, that "husband and wife are one person. "35 Austin 
writes, "I rather impute such fictions to the sheer imbecility (or, if 
you will, to the active and sportive fancies) of their grave and 
venerable authors, than to any deliberate design, good or evil."36 
32. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process ofLawmakin~.:, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197,240 (1976). 
33. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. X6X (2009) (holding that due 
process of law requires judicial recusal where significant judicial election contributions by 
a litigant to a judge in his or her case create an appearance of bias); Crowell v. Benson, 2X5 
U.S. 22 (1932) (permitting administrative adjudication of private rights so long as final 
adjudication was available in Article Ill courts); Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, 
The Real Constitutional Problem with State Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial 
Retention, and the Dan~.:ers of Popular Constitutionalism, 5<1 WM. & MARY L. REV. I (2014) 
(arguing that judicial elections violate the Due Process Clause). 
34. See L.L. Fuller, Le~.:al Fictions, 25 ILL L. REV. 3<13. 3X7 (1930). 
35. 2 JOliN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRlJDENCl: OR, THF PHILOSOPHY OF 
POSITIVE LAW <130 (1X73); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND ( 17<15-17<19) 442~45. 
36. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at <131. 
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From a narrow perspective, it would be oxymoronic to say that 
husband and wife are one person, no less than to say that two is 
equal to one. 
But as Fuller notes, Austin's complaint was not really against 
the use of language but rather against the claim being made about 
the legal relation between husband and wife.:n Even from the 
internal perspective of English law, husband and wife were not a 
unit for all purposes: "When it is said ... 'that husband and wife 
are one person,' the meaning merely is, that they lie under certain 
incapacities with respect to one another. And where those 
incapacities do not intervene, the fiction of their unity ceases, and 
they are deemed twain."3x Calling the phrase "imbecilic" draws 
rhetorical leverage from the absurdity of the language, taken 
narrowly, but Austin's disagreement with Blackstone is, in the 
end, a legal dispute, and a pedantic one at that Fuller likens 
"husband and wife are one" to the statement, "A has a legal right 
against B to payment of $1 00."39 Knowing that A has a legal right 
does not, without more, tell us "whether A may forcibly take $100 
from B's pocket, nor whether A may have B jailed if B refuses to 
pay the $100. For the particulars, [we] must go elsewhere." 40 
Likewise, to understand why substantive due process sounds 
oxymoronic requires more than a knowledge of the English 
language. For the particulars, we must tap into a certain, and 
notably incomplete, legal tradition. Abstracted from any such 
tradition at a particular point in time, "due process of law" is a 
meaningless string of words. 41 It acquires meaning as a legal term 
through its use in the law. The strongest version of this point 
would draw on the hermeneutic tradition and observe that all 
language is culturally and temporally situated, such that no phrase 
whose meaning is understood by its speakers or listeners could 
possibly be a nonsensical juxtaposition of opposites. "Jumbo 
shrimp" evokes RED LOBSTER®, not confusion. Indeed, we 
might better define an oxymoron not as a contradiction-in-terms 
but instead as a paradox, a superficial internal tension that abates 
37. See Fuller, supra note 34, at 3X7. 
3X. AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 630. 
31). Fuller, supra note 34, at 3XX. 
40. !d. 
41. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 1)0. 
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on reflection.42 Substantive due process is just such a paradox, and 
so calling it an oxymoron reflects rather than undermines its 
inherent consistency. 
But we need not take a detour into the philosophy of 
language to understand that "due process of law'' has meant 
different things to different actors at different points in the history 
of American law. No less an authority than Antonin Scalia 
provided a guided tour of those meanings in his concurring 
opinion in Pacific Mutual Lzf'e Insurance v. Haslip. 4:, The Haslip 
Court rejected a substantive due process claim by an insurance 
company complaining about the size of a punitive damages award. 
Justice Scalia agreed with the judgment but would have held that 
any procedurally sound punitive damages award that did not 
violate the Bill of Rights satisfied the Due Process Clause.44 In so 
arguing, he offered a standard account of the origins of the due 
process language in the U.S. Constitution. 
The clause seems first to have appeared in a 1354 English 
statute: "No man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be 
put out of land or tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor 
disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer by 
due process of the law."45 Despite conflicting historical evidence,4() 
the English jurist Sir Edward Coke thought the term was identical 
to the phrase "Law of the Land" (per legem terrae) as used in 
Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta: 
No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of 
his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or 
exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon 
him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or 
by the Law of the Land.47 
42. See Marvin K.L. Ching, A Literary and Unf?tlistic Analysis of Compact Verhal 
Paradox, 26 COLLEGE COMPOSITION & COMM. 3X4, 3X4 (1Y75). 
43. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 4YY U.S. 1, 24 (IYYO) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
44. See id. at 24-25. 
45. /d. at 2X (quoting Liberty of Subject, 1354, 2X Edw. 3, ch. 3 (Eng.)). 
46. See Keith Jurow, Untimt'lv Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due 
Process of' Law, ll) AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 267 ( IY75) ("[T[he provision seems merely to 
require that the appropriate writ he used to summon the accused hcfon: tht: court to 
ansvver the complaints against him."'). 
47. Haslip, 4l)l) U.S. at 2X (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting l) Hen. 
IlL ch. 2Y (1225)); See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TRLATISI ON TilE CONSTITUTION/\L 
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THF STATES OF THE 
AMERICAN UNION *351-*353 (1st cd. 1X6X). 
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The "law of the land" meant the customary adjudicative 
procedures under the English common law.4x 
American colonists, familiar with Coke, incorporated "law of 
the land" language into eighteenth century state constitutions, 
and the same basic meaning-according to customary English 
procedures-survived as the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.4l) In Murray's Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improve~nent Co.,50 decided in 1856, the Court 
affirmed Coke's translation but also noted that the provision 
constrained "the legislature as well as ... the executive and 
judicial powers of the government." 51 
The Court's first significant elaboration of the 1neaning of the 
clause subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
came in 1-lurtado v. California, an 1884 decision in which a 
convicted murderer argued, unsuccessfully, that due process of 
law required a grand-jury indictment.52 Justice Scalia's Haslip 
concurrence takes from Hurtado that historical practice is 
sufficient but not necessary to qualify as due process of law.53 A 
procedure not blessed by history would be invalid if it failed to 
comport with "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice 
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. "54 
Justice Scalia's opinion notes that by 1934, when the Court 
decided Snyder v. Massachusetts,55 consistency with the principles 
of "fundamental justice" seemed to have become a necessary 
condition of all procedures to satisfy the Constitution.50 
Although historical practice carried great and perhaps 
dispositive weight according to the Snyder Court, Justice Scalia 
writes that incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states 
caused cleavage between historical practice and what the Bill of 
Rights required.57 The Court came to the view that its own 
4X. See 1/aslip, 4l)l) U.S. at 2X (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
4lJ. ld. at 2lJ. 
50. Murray's Lessee v. Hohokcn Land & Improvement Co., 5l) U.S. (IX How.) 272 
(1X55). 
51. /d.at276. 
52. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (IXX4). 
53. Haslip, 4l)l) U.S. at 31~32. Justice Scalia's opinion understates the hrcadth of the 
Hurtado Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 64 and 
accompanying text. 
54. /d. at 32 (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535). 
55. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 2lJ1 U.S. lJ7 (llJ34 ). 
56. See Haslip, 4l)l) U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
57. See id. at 34~J5. 
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interpretations of the Bill of Rights, developed in the context of 
exclusive application to the federal government, also set a lower 
bound for what qualified as fundamental fairness. This conflation 
meant that states that violated the Bill of Rights as previously 
defined by the Court automatically violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5x Over time, and 
unsurprisingly, the Court began to understand the Due Process 
Clause to prohibit any practice that failed a test of ''fundamental 
fairness," no matter its historical pedigree and no 1natter its 
relationship to the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.5l) In 
liaslip, decided a quarter century ago, Justice Scalia's opinion 
traces this analysis to "due process opinions in recent decades. "60 
Justice Scalia's tour of the history of the Due Process Clause 
effectively makes the point that substantive due process is not a 
contradiction in terms. Due process of law is meaningless in the 
abstract, extracted from its historical situation. It once seems to 
have meant according to "specific writs employed in the English 
courts." 61 Later, it meant "according to the law of the land," a 
phrase that itself seemed to refer to customary English procedure. 
Later, it meant "according to traditional practice'' or "according 
to the tenets of fundamental justice." Later, and for at least the 
past several decades, it has meant "according to principles of 
fundamental fairness," a concededly substantive standard. 
And there is more. At least two other definitions of due 
process of law emerged during the early and middle decades of 
the nineteenth century and thus can be assumed to have 
influenced the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment. 62 On one 
view, due process of law would be violated by a law that defeated 
vested property rights by denying compensation after a taking or 
by transferring property from one private person to another.63 On 
another related but broader view, due process of law required that 
laws be appropriately general and prospective rather than class-
5X. See id. at 35. 
59. See id. at 36. 
nO. !d. at 3o (emphasis added). 
o1. !d. at 2X. 
o2. See EdwardS. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process ofLaw Hef(Jre the Civil War, 
24 HARV. L. REV. 3oo, 375 (1911 ); John Harrison, Suhstantive Due Process and the 
Constitutional Text, H3 VA. L. REV. 493, 49H ( 1997); Williams, supra note 7, at 41 o, 423-25. 
o3. See Harrison, supra note o2, at 506-20. 
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based, retrospective, or arbitrary.64 On either view, the Due 
Process Clause binds the legislature and extends beyond mere 
procedural regularity. Note as well that just about everyone 
agrees that the American usage of "due process of law" is 
synonyn1ous with "'by the law of the land," a phrase that, though 
likely a reference to procedures, does not explicitly refer to 
process.05 Was per legem terrae also a contradiction in terms? Or 
is it rather that the text is not literal and therefore not susceptible 
to denotation as an oxymoron in any but a trivial sense?60 
Justice Scalia has exhaustively worked out a theory that tells 
us which of the many definitions of due process of law is the one 
judges in constitutional cases should adopt. 07 But to say that the 
traditional understanding of a legal term (much less one 
traditional understanding among others) just is its current textual 
meaning confuses a theory of language with a theory of 
interpretation. ox And so, as we might have suspected all along, the 
claim that substantive due process is a contradiction in terms is 
really just a volley in the eternal debates over constitutional 
interpretation. Those debates are deeply contested and it really is 
very helpful for one side to be able to say, credibly on the surface, 
that the other side's position disobeys the rules of English. 
Revealing the sparseness of the textual argument against 
substantive due process unstacks the deck. 
II 
As noted, inconsistency with the text is hardly the sole 
objection to substantive due process. One could reject substantive 
due process for at least as many reasons as there are forms of 
64. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (IXX4) ("It is not every act, 
legislative in form, that is law ... It must he not a special rule for a particular person or a 
particular case, hut ... 'the general law,' ... and thus [excludes] ... special, partial, and 
arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of legislation."). 
o5. Although many scholars douht that Coke was right to equate the phrases, see, 
e.fi., Corwin, supra note 62, few douht that Americans relied on Coke's views. See Charles 
M. Hough, Due Process of Law- To-day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 21X, 21X (1lJ19). 
66. It would then not he a contradiction in terms hut would he a true oxymoron-a 
term whose literal sense is not interesting. See Brian Cummings, Litemlly Speakinfi, or, the 
Uteral Sensefrom AuJ;ustine to !.acan, 21 PARAGRAPH 200, 21X (19lJH). 
67. See fienerallv SCALIA, supra note 16 (expounding tcxtualist-originalist theories 
of interpretation). 
6X. C[: Fuller, supra note 34, at 377 (arguing that the claim that a word is a fiction 
"must he hascd ultimately on the notion that the word ... has reached the legitimate end 
of its evolution and that it ought to he pinned down where it now is"). 
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orthodox constitutional argument. One could argue that It IS 
inconsistent with the intentions or understandings of the framers 
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments; that it resurrects 
repudiated precedents such as Lochner or Dred Scott; that it 
requires substantive value judgments in a Constitution that prizes 
judicial regulation through procedure; or that it encourages 
judges to engage in policymaking at the expense of democracy. 
We have heard all of these complaints before. It would be 
surprising if no one before Ely thought to supplement these 
arguments with the simple observation that substantive due 
process is a nonsense phrase that makes hash of the text, but that 
isn't far from the truth. The phrase "substantive due process'' has 
been in legal circulation since at least the 1920s,6l) but it is 
surprisingly difficult to find criticisms of either the term itself or 
its underlying concept that are framed in textual terms prior to the 
1980s. 
In fact, I am aware of only three authors to have referred to 
substantive due process as either an oxymoron or a contradiction 
in terms before Ely did so in 1980.70 The earliest such reference 
appears in a 1956 Canadian law review article by W.F. Bowker, 
who was then the dean of the law school at the University of 
Alberta.71 Bowker was comparing property rights in Canada and 
the United States and noted that although the Due Process Clause 
seemed to place no substantive limitations on legislation affecting 
property rights, it had been interpreted otherwise. "Thus," 
Bowker wrote, "grew the concept of ·substantive due process,' a 
contradiction in terms to be sure, but one that for about a half a 
century ending just before World War II operated to impose 
severe restrictions on economic legislation."72 
The second reference comes in historian Leonard Levy's 
introduction to Robert McCloskey's classic defense of economic 
due process that appears in an edited volume of essays on the U.S. 
69. See, e.g, Note, Constitutionality of Judicial Dt'cisions in Tht'ir Substantive Law 
Aspect Under tht' Dut' Process Claus!:', 2H COLllM. L. RFV. 619, 619 (192H) (defining 
"suhstantivc due process"). 
70. I do not douht that there arc others, hut I have not found them. 
71. See W.F. Bowker, Protection of Basic Ri!{hts and Liberties, 2 U. B.C. LEGAL 
NOTES 2X1, 111 (1956). 
72. !d. at 111. 
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Constitution.73 Levy cntictzes McCloskey for failing to 
acknowledge that substantive due process ''was always a judicially 
contrived, oxymoronic concept that distorted history, logic, and 
plain 1neaning. "74 The certitude of Levy's skepticism here is 
mysterious. Levy has in other writing conceded that a version of 
substantive due process is historically available (if inconclusive), 
and moreover that the Due Process Clause is ''written in language 
that blocks fixed n1eanings. "75 
Finally, Hermine Herta Meyer, a Justice Department lawyer, 
referred to substantive due process as "self-contradictory," "a 
contradiction in terms," and "an invention of American judges" 
in a 1972 law review article defending the pretrial detention 
procedures of the District of Columbia Court Reform and 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.7(1 Meyer's article appears to have 
been part of a coordinated effort by members of the Nixon Justice 
Department to influence how courts would treat legislative bail 
reform.77 Meyer later called substantive due process a "nonsense 
phrase" in her 1977 book on the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment published by the vanity publisher Vantage Press.7s 
It is perilous to draw conclusions from this s1nall (and likely 
under-inclusive) sample of pre-1980s references to the internally 
contradictory character of substantive due process, but it is 
difficult not to notice that none of the three was a lawyer raised in 
the United States. Bowker was a Canadian lawyer, Levy a non-
lawyer born in Canada, and Meyer a German lawyer who 
immigrated to the United States as an adult. This coincidence 
suggests (if dimly) the possibility that a superficially available 
textual argument against substantive due process was nonetheless 
771. Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to Rohert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process 
and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 157 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1966). 
74. !d. 
7.S. LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, 
RIGHTS, AND HISTORY 120 (llJlJ.S). 
76. Hermine Herta Meyer, ('onstitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 13H I, 
1417 (llJ72). 
77. See Matthew J. Hegreness, America's Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 
.S.S ARIZ. L. REV. lJOlJ, lJ.SH-.SlJ (2013). 
7H. HERMINE HFRTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTII 
AMENDMENT 127 (llJ77). 
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foreign to the American legal culture. 79 The canonical critique was 
located outside the text. 
The origin of substantive due process is sometimes traced to 
Chief Justice Taney's lead opinion in Dred Scott.xo This accusation 
(le mot juste) is better rhetoric than it is legal history,x 1 but its 
accuracy is not presently important. It is enough to say that the 
opinion may plausibly be read as holding that a law prohibiting 
slavery in federal territories violates the Fifth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause because it deprives slaveholders of vested 
property rights in their slaves.x2 The dissenters, Justice McLean 
and Justice Curtis, disputed this holding on the merits but neither 
of them questioned the applicability of the Due Process Clause as 
a substantive limitation on legislative activity. 
Likewise, in Lochner v. New York, the chief error of which 
has frequently been described as its resort to substantive due 
process,x3 neither of the two dissenting opinions suggested that the 
Due Process Clause is or should be concerned only with 
adjudicative procedures.x4 Justice Harlan explicitly endorsed 
substantive due processx.5 but found the Bakeshop Act 
reasonable.xn Justice Holmes counseled legislative deference-
what we today would call rational basis review- but his opinion 
79. In case it is not clear from the main text, I do not wish to overstate this point. 
Bowker received his LL.M. degree from the University of Minnesota, see Bowker, supra 
note 71, at 2H1, Levy is a Pulitzer Prize-winning American constitutional historian, see 
LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF TilE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIG liT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION ( 19hX), and Meyer hccame a prominent federal government lawyer, see 
Hcgrcncss, supra note 77, al 95H-59. Still, whether one's exposure to the domestic legal 
culture occurs during one's formative professional years or at some other time might 
plausihly affect one's instincts towards a legal term of art such as due process of law. In 
particular, judicial review in Canada did not extend to constitutional rights at the time of 
Bowker's writing, and the Continental civil law tradition rejects the kind of evolutionary 
jurisprudence that gave hirth to suhstantivc due process. 
HO. See, e.f.:., BORK, supra note 17, at31. 
HI. See James W. Ely, Jr. The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reali(v in the 
Orif.{ins ofSuhstantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMM. 315, 31H (1999). 
H2. Drcd Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1H57). The "suhstantivc due process" 
holding, which docs not usc the precise term, is notoriously opaque. See DON E. 
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS 3H2 (197H). 
X3. See, e.g, Griswold v. Connecticut, 3X1 U.S. 479, 514-1fl (Black, J., dissenting). 
H4. See Corwin, supra note 62, at 367; John Paul Stevens, Learninf.: on the .loh, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1561-62 (2006). 
H5. Lochner v. New York, 19H U.S. 45. 6H (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Granting, then, 
that there is a liberty of contract which cannot he violated even under the sanction of direct 
legislative enactment .... "). 
Hfl. /d. at69-73. 
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nonetheless rests on the view that the Due Process Clause 
requires judges to inquire into "'fundamental principles as they 
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our 
law."~'7 Holmes betrayed no textual or other principled objection 
to substantive due process: "General propositions do not decide 
concrete cases."~'~' 
There is son1e evidence that Louis Brandeis, the other great 
dissenter of the Lochner era, believed, as a n1atter of principle, 
that the Due Process Clause should be limited to procedural 
irregularities. Felix Frankfurter noted as much in transcribing a 
1923 conversation with Brandeis in which the latter is reported to 
have said further that, so long as due process is recognized as 
having a substantive component, it must be applied to those rights 
that are truly fundamental such as speech and education.~'Y 
Brandeis's contingent adoption of substantive due process reflects 
his position in Meyer v. Nebraskal)0 and Pierce v. Society of 
Sistersl) 1 - both education cases in which Brandeis joined the 
majority's substantive due process holding- and in Gilbert v. 
Minnesota,l)2 in which he dissented from the Court's opinion 
upholding a Minnesota anti-sedition Jaw. After recounting the 
Court's series of substantive due process holdings in the economic 
realm, Brandies wrote in Gilbert, ''I cannot believe that the liberty 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes only liberty 
to acquire and to enjoy property.'' 93 
Justice Brandeis's reluctant acceptance of substantive due 
process is also of course reflected in his famous concurring 
opinion in Whitney v. California. 94 ''Despite arguments to the 
contrary which had seemed to me persuasive," he wrote, ''it is 
settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
'1:17. !d. at 7fl (Holml.:s, J., dissl.:nting). 
'1:1'1:1. !d. lndl.:l.:d, although Holml.:s dissented from the Court's suhstantive due process 
holding in Meyer v. Nehraska, see Bartels v. Iowa, 2fl2 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting), he joined the unanimous opinion in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 2fl'l:l U.S. 510 
(1925), without any separate writing. Moreover, his dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. New 
York, 2()'1:\ U.S. 652 ( 1925), suggested a (perhaps grudging) commitment to suhstantive 
protection of rights via Due Process Clause. See id. at fl72 (Holmes, J ... dissenting). 
'1:19. Melvin I. lJ rofsky, The Brandeis- Frankfurter Conversations, 19'1:15 SuP. Cr. REV. 
2lJ9, 320. 
lJO. 2fl2 lJ .S. 3lJO (llJ23 ). 
91. 2fl'l:l U.S. 510 (1lJ25). 
92. 254 lJ .s. 325 ( 1920). 
93. !d. at 343 (1lJ20) (Brandeis, .1., dissenting). 
lJ4. 274U.S. 357 (1927). 
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applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of 
procedure. ~' 95 I am not aware of any writings in which Brandeis 
specified what~ precisely~ those persuasive arguments comprised. 
This point is significant in itself. Brandeis's approach to law was 
intensely fact-specific, not given to pronouncements of what legal 
provisions mean in a metaphysical sense. It was appropriate to his 
life as an advocate that the meaning of the Due Process Clause 
could be settled through legal argumentation and precedent and 
not thereafter revisited ex tabula rasa. Moreover, as his Gilbert 
dissent reflects, Justice Brandeis's views on the Due Process 
Clause are inseparable fron1 his views on the property rights with 
which the clause had always been associated in its substantive 
form. 
His disciple Frankfurter likewise agreed with Brandeis about 
the procedural connotations of substantive due process90 but 
likewise see1ned motivated less by any philosophical objection 
than by distaste for the results he observed. Like Brandeis, 
Frankfurter supported the Court's decisions in Meyer and Pierce, 
but he thought that liberty-protecting decisions such as those 
could not justify the cost of property-protecting decisions like 
Lochner and Coppage v. Kansas. 97 As a judge, Frankfurter gave 
no hint of dissent from the proposition that the Due Process 
Clause forbids certain significant rights deprivations.9x He joined 
several opinions in which the Court overturned (or the joined 
dissent would have overturned) non-procedural state laws as 
violations of due process;9 l) concurring in 5'weezy v. New 
Hampshire, overturning a state-level subversive activities 
prosecution, Justice Frankfurter wrote that striking a balance 
between a citizen's right to political privacy and the State's right 
to self-protection ''is the inescapable judicial task in giving 
substantive content, legally enforced, to the Due Process 
95. /d. at 373. 
%. Urofsky, supra note X9, at 320; Frankfurter, The Red Terror of.ludicial Reform, 
40 NEW REPUBLIC 110, 113 (1924) ("The due process clauses ought to go."). 
97. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I (1915) (invalidating legislation that forhid yellow-
dog contracts); see Felix Frankfurter, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration'!, 
unsigni:d editorial, 43 NEW REPUBLIC X5, X6 ( 1925), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS: 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 195, ]9() (1st eli., 1939). 
9X. See Louis H. Pollak, Mr. Justice Frankji1rter: .ludKment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 67 YALE L.J. 304,317 (1957). 
99. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 30X U.S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296 (1940); Everson v. BLI. of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947). 
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Clause.'' 100 'robe sure, Frankfurter, like Holmes, believed deeply 
in legislative deference. 101 But that did not mean the Court should 
stay altogether out of the business of ensuring that, as Justice 
Jackson wrote, joined by Frankfurter, ''reasonable general 
legislation [is] reasonably applied to the individual. " 102 
To recap, none of the great opponents of substantive due 
process prior to the 1960s opposed it on textual grounds. As 
discussed below, that omission results in part from an intellectual 
temperament within the constitutional culture that was less 
literalist and, rclatcdly, less worshipful of the constitutional text 
and its authors. 10 :~ 
Discussion of substantive due process among constitutional 
lawyers and commentators grew dramatically in the 1960s and 
1970s. Figure 1 reproduces an Ngram of references to 
''substantive due process" in English-language books digitally 
catalogued by Googlc Books from 1920 to 2008. 104 The Ngram 
illustrates a sharp upward trend with an inflection point at 1965, 
the year in which the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. 
Connecticut105 and four years after the Court decided Griswold's 
predecessor case, Poe v. Ulln1an. 106 Griswold, which overturned a 
Connecticut ban on contraceptive usc, drew plenty of fire, 
including from the dissenting opinions of J usticc Black and Justice 
Stewart. But neither opinion argues that the Due Process Clause 
applies only to "process." J usticc Black opposed Griswold and 
other substantive due process holdings on the ground that they 
protected rights that were not explicit in the constitutional text 
and therefore granted an inappropriate amount of discretion to 
100. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring 
in the result). 
I 0 I. See Pollak, supra note 9K 
102. Shaughnessy v. United States ex ret. Mczei, 345 U.S. 206,222 (1953). 
Hn. See Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the Foundations of the Security State, 103 
CALIF. L. REV. 335 (2015). 
104. Googlc hooks Ngram Viewer, https://hooks.google.com/ngrams/graph? 
content=suhstantive+due+proccss& year _start= 1920& year _end=200H&corpus= 15& 
smoothing=3&share=&dircct_url=tl 'Y,,3B%2Csuhstantive%20due%20process%3B% 
2Cc0 (search run Aug. 9, 2015). The tahlc has a smoothing of 3, which means that each 
year represents an average of that year's value and the values of the three years hcfore and 
after. Also, the values arc reported as a percentage of the complete catalog for any given 
year, which makes it unlikely that the trend is driven hy changes in the denominator rather 
than the numerator. It is difficult to say this with certainty, however, since we do not know 
how the proportion of hooks in the dataset relating to constitutional law varies over time. 
105. 3H1 U.S. 479 (1965). 
10o. 367 U.S. 497 (IY61). 
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Figure 1 
judges. 107 Justice Stewart joined Justice Black's op1n1on and 
opposed the decision on similar democratic process grounds. 10x 
The structure of Justice Douglas's majority opinion likely 
influenced the locus of criticism. Justice Douglas did not follow 
Lochner in arguing that the Due Process Clause, of its own force, 
authorizes judges to inquire into the substantive reasonableness 
of state laws. Rather, he argued that the Connecticut anti-
contraceptive law touched on interests implicated in 
aconstitutional right to privacy that, as a positive matter, could be 
located within the interstices of the text of the Bill of Rights. 10l) 
This approach proved an easy target. Representing the right to 
privacy as a "penumbra" or ''emanation" from the Constitution 
seemed a reach to many, one that exposed a deficit in serious 
arguments in favor of such rights. Grounding the interests 
Douglas sought to protect more directly in the Due Process 
Clause- as the opinions of Justice Goldberg, 110 Justice Harlan, 111 
107. See Griswold, 3X1 U.S. at 510-21 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black's hclicf in 
total incorporation, sec Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., 
dissenting), would have made it incongruous for him to criticize Griswold as an unduly 
suhstantivc usc of the Due Process Clause. 
lOX. See 3X1 U.S. at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
109. See id. at 4Xl-X4. 
110. Griswold, 1XI U.S. at 4X6 (Goldhcrg, J., concurring). 
111. Lochner v. New York, 19X U.S. 45,65 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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and Justice White 112 all sought to do in different ways- was more 
open to criticism based on Lochnerism but was, by comparison, a 
more textualist approach. 
Consistent with that observation, the dominant criticisms of 
substantive due process in the decade following Griswold tended 
to be prudential rather than textual. Thus, Alexander Bickel and 
Philip Kurland rejected a constitutional right to privacy or 
otherwise objected to Griswold or Roe on the nr1erits. 113 Both 
believed in incorporation via the Due Process Clause. Neither 
appeared to view the text as compelling a procedural focus. 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Roe also did not object to 
substantive due process tout court. 114 Indeed, he argued that an 
abortion restriction without an exception for procedures thought 
necessary to save the pregnant woman's life would violate the 
Due Process Clause. 115 Even Robert Bark lodged no textual 
objection to the word "process." Bark believed that any 
constitutional rights not specifically enumerated in the text 
requires judges to make impermissible value judgments, and so 
substantive due process was an invitation to activism rather than 
(necessarily) a perversion of the text. 116 Indeed, Bark would 
sacrifice the text to judicial restraint. 
Textual arguments against the Due Process Clause gained 
currency in the 1980s, following Ely's book. Since then, literally 
hundreds of authors, including several judges in the course of 
opinions, have called substantive due process oxymoronic or 
contradictory, and a fair number have cited Ely for that 
proposition. 117 Notably, the first state or federal judge to have 
112. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,541 (1977) (White. J., dissenting). 
113. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27-2X ( 1977); 
PHILIP B. KURLAND. POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND TilE WARREN COURT 161 
( 1973). 
114. See Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (Rchnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White, 
who also dissented in Roe, was not opposed to suhstantivc due process. See Griswold, 3X1 
U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
115. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 173. 
116. Rohcrt H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prohlems, 47 
IND. L.J. I, 9 (1971). Bork accepted incorporation via the Due Process Clause. 
117. Court decisions include. among others: United Statl:s v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26,39 
(1994) (Scalia. J., concurring in thl: judgment); Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d X56, 
X66 n.10 (6th Cir. 19lJ7) (Boggs); McKinney v. Pate, 9X5 F.2d 1502,1509 (11th Cir. 19lJ3) 
(Fay), opinion vacated, l)l)4 F.2d 772 (lith Cir. 19lJ3); Saukstdis v. City of Chicago, 932 
F.2d 1171, 1173 (7th Cir. 19lJ1) (Eastnhrook); Braley v. Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 22X (6th 
Cir. 1990) (Nelson, J., concurring); Blaska v. Fuentes, X36 F.2d 1347, at *13 (6th Cir. l9XX) 
(Nelson); Brower v. Cty of Inyo, Xl7 F.2d 540,544 n.4 (lJth Cir. 19X7) (Goodwin); Unitl:d 
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called substantive due process an oxymoron in a published 
opinion appears to have been Posner, who did so in a 19H2 case in 
which (apparently without irony) he called the doctrine 
simultaneously ''exotic'' and "ubiquitous.'' 11 x Judge Posner has 
referred to the phrase as oxymoronic several times since. 11 t) 
This trend surely says less about substantive due process, 
which meant about the same (if not less, substantively) in the 
1980s as it did before, than it says about prevailing practices of 
constitutional argumentation. The more or less sudden realization 
that "substantive" contradicts "process" in the Due Process 
Clause- and that this is a fatal defect- coincides with the rise of 
a certain kind of originalism. That rise was not organic but rather 
was deliberately orchestrated by conservative activists both inside 
and outside of the Reagan Justice Department. 120 Indeed, a 
substantial number of the judicial opinions to have made textual 
criticisms of substantive due process- and the great majority of 
the appellate opinions- were written by appointees of that 
department. 121 Two of those appellate judges, Danny Boggs of the 
Sixth Circuit and Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, 
worked under Bork in the Office of the Solicitor General in the 
1970s. 
Originalism does not, per se, support the view that 
substantive due process is contradictory. As noted, whether the 
framers of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments meant to endow 
Statl:s Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 156X (Xth Cir. 19X3) (Arnold): Ellis v. Hamilton, 
669 F.2d 510,512 (7th Cir. 19X2) (Posner); Tohias v. Pletzke, 933 F. Supp. 2d X92, 917 n.1X 
(E.D. Mich. 2013) (Ludington); Wolverine Fireworks Display v. Towne, No. 12-10426, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79229, *42 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (Ludington); Estep v. City of 
Somerset, No. 10-X26-ART, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1351X9, *16 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (Thapar); 
Cramer v. Chiks, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1352 n.4 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (Ferguson, Jr., J.); Swales 
v. Twp. of Ravenna, 9X9 F. Supp.925, 934 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (Bell); Jones v. Doria, 767 
F. Supp. 1432, 1437 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Ex parte Anonymous, X03 So. 2d 542,550 (Ala. 2001) 
(Moore, C.J., concurring specially). 
11H. f:llis, 669 F.2d at 512. 
119. See Torregrossa v. Bd. of Trs, No. 9X-374, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 73X3 (7th Cir. 
1999) (per curiam); Wilkins v. May, H72 F.2d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 19X9); III. Psychological 
Ass'n. v. Falk, XIH F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. I9H7); Duckworth v. Franzen, 7XO F.2d MS, 
652 (7th Cir. 19H5); Bighy v. City of Chicago, 766 F.2d 1053, I 05X (7th Cir. 19X5). 
120. See THOMAS M. KECK,THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 154-
55, 15H-59 (2004); Jamal Greene, Selling Originafism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009); Rohert Post 
& Rl:va Siegel, Origina!ism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 
FORDHAM L. Rr:v. 545 (2006). 
121. Those appointees include Boggs, Frank Easterhrook, David Nelson, Posner, and 
Scalia. Bork was also of course a D.C. Circuit appointee of President Reagan. 
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the Due Process Clause with substantive content is a contested 
question, and the phrase "'due process of law" has long been 
thought synonymous with "'according to the law of the land," 
which is not inherently procedural. The 1980s turn against the 
words instead reflects a particularly literal, acontextual, and 
politically opportunistic (if sincere) approach to historical 
argument: in the spirit of oxymorons, call it anachronistic 
original ism. 
Words in legal documents are not just their counterparts in 
ordinary speech. They are meant to be understood by their 
handlers-lawyers, usually- who operate under certain 
professional assumptions that may diverge from common speech 
conventions. This is not to say that legal documents, and 
especially constitutions, are not meant to be understood by non-
lawyers; it is to say, rather, that even constitutions are not meant 
to be misunderstood by lawyers. It is telling that Justice Black, 
perhaps the most committed textualist in the Court's history, did 
not believe the text of the Due Process Clause had a facially 
obvious meaning: "Some might think that the words themselves 
are vague," he wrote in his dissenting opinion in In re Winship, 122 
"[b Jut any possible ambiguity disappears when the phrase is 
viewed in the light of history and the accepted meaning of those 
words prior to and at the time our Constitution was written." 123 
The belief that ''substantive" and "process" are necessarily, 
indeed risibly, in conflict transposes a modern, common-sense 
view of the meaning of English words onto words in eighteenth 
and nineteenth-century legal documents. 
For a non-originalist and a pragmatist like Posner, 124 there is 
nothing untoward about this move. He does not, after all, reject 
substantive due process; he just thinks it sounds silly, and he's 
right. For others, conflating the common sense meaning of today 
with the legal meaning of yesterday can go some way towards 
affecting the legal meaning of today. "It is not that 'substantive' 
due process is linguistically self-contradictory," Henry Monaghan 
wrote in 1981. "It is not any longer, if one accepts the teachings of 
122. 3lJ7 U.S. 35X (1lJ70). 
123. !d. at 37X (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black is referring to the words of the 
Fifth Amendment, though the case concerned the words of the Fourteenth. The casual 
conflation of these clauses is perplexing for a tcxtualisl-originalist. See Jamal Greene, 
Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. lJ7X (2012). 
124. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003). 
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ordinary language philosophy that 'meaning is use.' The core 
problem is one of constitutional theory, not of language." 125 But 
adopting and pron1oting a constitutional theory that relies on 
language means that changing language meaning- as through 
"'use'' -serves one's theory. Through sufficient repetition within 
the appropriate language community, the view that substantive 
due process is an oxymoron can becon1e a self-fulfilling prophesy. 
If it was not an oxymoron in 19Rl, it is now-or so that was the 
goal. 
But there is more to it than this. Although the phrase 
substantive due process has been around for nearly a century, the 
category of claims it describes was more often simply called "due 
process" for much of that time. As substantive due process 
became more frequently invoked as a distinct constitutional 
claim, procedural due process- which seems redundant- also 
was invoked more often. Using two different words for 
something- making it some things- has cognitive in addition to 
linguistic consequences. Experiments in linguistics have 
demonstrated that the categories that exist within a particular 
language community influence participants' perception of 
phenomena in the world. For example, native Spanish speakers 
tend strongly to associate objects with the genders grammatically 
assigned to them within the Spanish language, even if those 
assignments are arbitrary. 126 Thus, consistent with patterns across 
languages, a native English speaker is likely to code natural 
objects as feminine and artificial objects as masculine; for Spanish 
speakers, this tendency is often overridden by the grammatical 
categories of Spanish. 127 
A soft form of linguistic relativity seems likely to influence 
judgments made within the language community of constitutional 
lawyers. Substantive due process peels away from procedural due 
process not just because of any underlying conceptual or semantic 
difference but also because they carry different labels. And as 
between these labels, procedural due process surely seems more 
"about'' "process," and therefore to have more conceptual 
125. See HL:nry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 5o N.Y.U. L. Rr v. 353, 373-
74 (1lJX1). 
12fl. See Maria D. SL:ra, ct al., Grammatical and Conceptual Forces in the Attrihution 
of Gender hy E"n!{lish and Spanish Speakers, lJ COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 2fll (1lJlJ4). 
127. Seeid. 
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integrity. Thus, the phrase "substantive due process" helps to 
generate the very textual anomaly that it is said to describe. 
III 
Substantive due process may not be a contradiction in terms, 
but it sounds like one. Comparing it to green pastel redness is 
funny, if a bit esoteric. Three of the most significant American 
legal figures of the last half century, representing wildly different 
jurisprudential and political ideologies- Ely, Posner, and 
Scalia- have called substantive due process an oxymoron in 
prominent writings. Is that enough to make it one? Should it be 
enough? 
A comparative example helps to sharpen the question. 
Discussions of linguistic relativity migrated into the culture long 
ago in the form of the old saw that there are x number of 
"Eskimo" words for snow. The observation is meant to show that 
language and perception are deeply interrelated. Linguist Laura 
Martin has described the observation itself, however, as a kind of 
folklore. 12x It seems first to have originated in a 1911 article by the 
anthropologist Franz Boas, who mentioned four different Eskimo 
words for "snow" in an article about the difficulty in comparing 
language structures. 12l) Benjamin Wharf, a linguist, later 
popularized the example, mentioning five words for "snow," 
though without naming any specific sources or data. 130 Two 
important 1950s anthropological textbooks whose authors were 
influenced by Wharf mention the example. Martin says that one 
or both of those books "were probably read by most 
anthropologists trained between 1960 and 1970, and by countless 
other students as well during that heyday of anthropology's 
popularity." 131 By 1986, Martin was able to say that "[t]extbook 
references to the example have reached such proliferation that no 
complete inventory seems possible," 132 and that the example had 
12X. See Laura Martin, "Eskimo Words for Snow": A Case Study in the Genesis and 
Decay of an Anthropological L'xample, XX AMER. ANTHROP. 41X (19go). 
129. !d. at 41X (citing Franz Boas, Introduction, THE HANDBOOK OF NORTH 
AMERICAN INDIANS 40 (1911 )). 
130. !d. (citing Benjamin Lee Whorf, Science and Linguistics, 42 TECH. REV. 229-31, 
247-4X ( 1940) ). 
131. !d. (citing EDWARD T. HALL, TilE SILENT LANGUAGE 107-0X, 110 (1959), and 
ROGER BROWN, WORDS AND THINGS (195X)). 
132. !d. at 420. 
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deeply infiltrated pop culture: it appeared in a Lanford Wilson 
play, 133 a trivia encyclopedia, 134 a New York Times editorial, 135 and 
on a local weather forecast. By the time it reached this last source, 
Boas's four words had become "two hundred.'' 136 
The "Eskimo words for snow" tale is a meme, ''an idea that 
becomes commonly shared through social transmission.'' 137 There 
is disagreement within the memetics literature as to what more 
one can say about memes and the degree to which they possess 
the properties of evolving organisms or map onto existing social 
scientific understandings of diffusion of practices, beliefs, and 
other cultural artifacts. 1311 A technical definition is unnecessary to 
the basic, suggestive insight. The motivating ideas behind memes 
are that they are social- reproduction through human networks 
is an existential condition- and that they tend to replicate 
through imitation or absorption rather than through reflection. 13(} 
The jurisprudentially inclined will recognize this feature of meme 
transmission as "content-independence," a quality that also 
attaches to the authority of common law judicial precedents. 140 
Memes are ubiquitous in American constitutional law. 
Indeed, the common law system encourages the transmission of 
legal information through shared understandings replicated by 
processes of imitation that risk mutating the original source. 141 
133. 
134. 
(llJI-\4)). 
!d. (citing The Fifth of July (Jl)7X)). 
!d. (citing Tm: STRAIGHT DOPE: A COMPENDIUM OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE 
135. !d. (referring to Editorial, There's Snow Synonym. N.Y. TIMES. Feb.Y, llJI-\4). 
136. !d. at 420. 
137. Robert Aunger, Introduction, in DARWINIZING CULTlJRF 2 (Robern Aunger 
ed., 2000). 
131-1. Compare DAWKINS, supra note I 0, at 206 (describing memes in terms of mental 
activity), with William L. Benzon, Culture as an F;vo/utionary Arma, Jl) J. Soc. & 
EVOUJTIONARY SYSTEMS 321, 323 (llJ%) (describing memes in strictly phenotypical 
terms). 
13l). See DAWKINS, supra note 10, at 206; SUSAN BLACKMORE, TilL MEME MACHINE 
(1YlJ4); see also Henry Plotkin, Culture and Psychological Mechanisms, in DARWINIZING 
CULTURE, supra note n7, at 6lJ, 7X-7l) (distinguishing "surface-level" and "deep-level" 
memes based on the complexity of the acquired and transmitted knowledge); c( J.M. 
BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 43 (Jl)l)l'\) ("Memes 
encompass all the forms of cultural know-how that can be passed to others through the 
various forms of imitation and communication."). 
140. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 62 (200l)); H.L.A. Hart, 
Commands and Authoritative LeJ.:al Reasons, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: JURISPRUDENCE 
AND POLITICAL THEORY 243, 261 (1lJK2). 
141. See Michael S. Fried, The E'volution of LeJ.:al Concepts: A Memetic Perspective, 
3l) JURIMETRICS 2lJI, 2lJ2, 303-04 (Jl)l)lJ). 
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That imitation may be simple, as in a typical string cite, or it may 
be complex, as in the practice of referring to anticanonical cases 
to express methodological or substantive disagreement with an 
interlocutor. For example, citations to Lochner or to Dred Scott 
are not precedent-based in the usual sense but are better 
characterized as forms of ethical argument. 142 Ethical argument 
draws upon the American self-conception as a source of 
interpretive authority. 14:~ Invocation of anticanonical cases is 
intended as a conversation-stopper, and the capacity of these 
cases to serve this function endows them with value beyond 
whatever underlying analogical power they may contribute. 
Much of what goes under the heading of blackletter 
constitutional law also has a memetic character. Owing to its 
complex relationship to politics and the magnitude of the (often 
capricious) Supreme Court's role within it, constitutional law has 
a contingent character that resists hornbook formulations. For 
example, it is common teaching that legislative abridgements of 
fundamental rights are reviewed under strict scrutiny, and yet it is 
remarkably difficult to find cases in which the Court has applied 
that standard. This is because, consistent with the thrust of this 
Essay, the Court in practice grades the reviewing standard by the 
gravity of the abridgement even as it rarely acknowledges a 
general practice of doing so. 144 Karl Llewelyn long ago recognized 
interpretive canons as having a similarly memetic structure: "to 
make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the canon must 
be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon." 145 
Canons are rhetorical resources, and Llewelyn's memorable 
observation that each canon-based claim confronts an equally 
canonical counterclaim means to demonstrate, whimsically, that 
their proliferation is content-independent. 146 
Richard Primus has identified a related phenomenon as a 
"continuity tender," which he defines as ''an inherited ritual 
formula that one repeats to affirm a connection to one's 
predecessors, not to endorse the content of that statement as 
142. See Greene. supra note l), at 463. 
143. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE l)4 (1lJX2). 
144. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in 7heory and Strict in F'act: An Empirical Analysis of 
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 5l) VAND. L. REV. 7lJ3 (2006). 
145. Karl N. Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. :-;lJ.\ 401 (llJ50). 
146. Seeid.at401~~06. 
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one's predecessors originally understood it.''I 47 For Primus, a 
continuity tender is a kind of rote incantation that serves a 
sy1nbolic link to the past, on the order of Royal Assent to statutes 
passed by the British parliament.I 4~ "Be it enacted by the Queen's 
Most Excellent Majesty .... " serves the same community-
building purpose that other rituals serve, but it has no practical 
significance. WJ Primus's motivating lJ .S. constitutional example is 
the notion that the federal government is a government of 
enumerated powers. Courts recite this principle in constitutional 
cases in order to emphasize a core ethical commitment of 
American constitutionalism,Iso but in practice Congress has come 
to have a general police power. 15 I 
All continuity tenders are memes but not all memes are 
continuity tenders. Repetition of a constitutional meme need not 
serve the purpose of symbolic continuity with the past. It might 
alternatively serve as a kind of cognitive shortcut, or heuristic.I 52 
Constitutional decision-making can be difficult. The resources for 
resolving such cases-typically identified as text, history, 
structure, precedent, and consequences-can be mutually 
inconsistent, and there is no consensus on how (or whether) to 
assign weights among them.I 53 Cognitive heuristics can place the 
interpreter into a frame of mind that streamlines decision-making, 
and particular memes can be vehicles for these heuristics. 
Consider two heuristics that are pervasive within legal 
argument: the affect and expertise heuristics. The affect heuristic 
involves reliance on whether a potential risk is emotionally coded 
147. Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters~ (March 25, 2015), MICH. L. REV., 
forthcoming 201 fl, http://ssrn.com/ahstract=2471924. 
14~. See id. 
149. See id. at ~~lJ. 
150. See Bossrn, supra note 143 at 20 ( 19lJ1 ). 
151. See Primus, supra note 147, at 14. 
152. See Daniel Kahncman & Amos Tvcrsky, .lwlf!,ment Under Uncertaintv: Heuristics 
and Biases, I ~5 SCIENCE 1124 (1974 ); see also BALKIN, supra note DlJ, at 5~~59 (describing 
the role of certain memes that act as "cognitive filters"); c( Frederic M. Bloom, 
lnj(nmation Lost and Found, 100 CAL. L. REV. fl35, fl7fl (2012) ("II Information seekers 
expend as little effort as they can. Given a choice between low-value-hut-easily-accessible 
information and high-value-hut-harder-to-find substitutes, people pick low value time and 
again."). 
153. See BOBBITT, supra note 143 at 122~25 (IYlJ3); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, 
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ( 19~~). But see Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., A Construc:tivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Arf!,umentation, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 11 ~7 ( 19~7). 
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as "good" or "bad." 154 This heuristic is critical to System 1, or 
experiential, thinking, which "encodes reality in images, 
metaphors, and narratives to which affective feelings have 
become attached." 155 The expertise heuristic involves reliance on 
expert validation as a quick-and-ready measure of the accuracy of 
a particular judgment. 156 Legal arguments, including those offered 
by constitutional judges, make frequent use both of appeals to 
emotion (including through humor) and of appeals to authority. 157 
Appeals of those sorts align constitutional argument with other 
modes of practical discourse, as they correspond, respectively, 
with the pathetic and ethical modes of persuasion first identified 
by Aristotle. 15x 
The association of the substantive-due-process-as-oxymoron 
me me with a joke by Ely, and subsequently with the views of other 
leading figures in constitutional law, enables legal audiences-
including judges, lawyers, and non-lawyers-to process its 
underlying content using heuristics. This is not to say that the 
presence of the me me disables systematic processing- both 
systematic and heuristic processing can occur in relation to the 
same proposition-nor is it to say that commentators must be 
wrong that substantive due process is an oxymoron. One could 
disagree with the analysis in Part I and it would still be the case 
that the ways in which the substantive-due-process-as-oxymoron 
meme is typically communicated make its truth or falsity less 
relevant to its capacity to persuade. As Michael Fried writes, 
"Memes, like genes, will succeed if they are good replicators, 
whether or not they are correct or good for their human 
carriers." 159 
There is reason, though, for constitutional lawyers to be less 
bothered by this possibility than linguists are bothered by 
154. Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk Perception and Affect, 15 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 322, 322 (2006). 
155. !d. at 323; see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011) 
(descrihing the differences hctween System I and System 2 thinking); Shelly Chaiken et 
al., Heuristic and Systematic ProcessinJi Within and Beyond the Persuasion Context, in 
UNINTENDED THOU<iiiT 212,212--213 (James S. Ulcman & John A. Bargh eds., 1l}X9) 
(contrasting "heuristic" versus "systematic" processing). 
156. See Chaiken et al., supra note 155, at216. 
157. See Jamal (;reene, Pathetic ArJiument in Conslitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 13Xl} (2013). 
15X. See id.; ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE (GEORGE 
A. KENNEDY TRANS., OXFORD liN IV. PRESS 1991 ). 
15l}. Fried, supra note 141, at 2l}X. 
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apocryphal claims about Eskimo words. Martin's article on the 
words-for-snow meme provoked a vigorous scholarly debate over 
the accuracy of the underlying proposition. 160 Whether the 
different descriptors for snow in various dialects of Eskimo and 
Inuit languages are really compound words atop a small and 
uninteresting set of roots or whether the dozens of words for snow 
and snow-related phenomena are each lexically distinct and 
worthy of study is of great importance to linguists and 
anthropologists who focus on indigenous languages. 161 Notably for 
our purposes, the fact that local weathermen appear to believe 
that there are 200 Eskimo words for snow (within a given dialect, 
the laugh line assumes) is of no moment to the serious debate 
among language professionals. They are simply different 
discourses, between which any influence, such as it may be, is 
unidirectional, from the Benjamin Wharfs of the world down to 
the Brick Tamlands. 
Constitutional law obeys a different epistemology. It is 
primarily the product of a "'constitutional culture" of non-judicial 
actors whose values and beliefs it incorporates. 162 This 
observation is nearly axiomatic among political scientists, and it is 
broadly shared by constitutional lawyers as well. 163 Constitutional 
law takes its cues from-sits in dialogue with-legal 
understandings embedded within the broader culture, and relies 
on that culture for validation. Standard accounts of court 
decision-making understand certain prudential mechanisms from 
the perspective of the need for the law, as Neil Siegel writes, to 
"'account for the conditions of its own legitimation." 164 As Robert 
1 fiO. See Igor Krupnik & Ludgcr Muller-Wille, Franz Boas and lnuktitut Terminolof,;y 
/(Jr Ice and Snow: From the Emergence of the Field to the "Great Hskimo Vocahulary 
1-/oax", in SIKU: KNOWING OUR ICE 377, 39()-lJ1 (2010). 
lfil. Seeid. 
1 fi2. See Rohcrt C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, 
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (2003). 
1fi3. See H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS() (2002) (defending a vision of "constitutional 
law as a servant of American political life rather than its master"). Those who deny the 
dynamic and culturally dependent nature of constitutional law arc often the ones most 
likely to dcscrihc suhstantivc due process as an oxymoron, thcrchy demonstrating, again, 
that modern forms of originalism arc sustained hy epistemological resources that only 
living constitutionalism can supply. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 
()57 (2009); Post & Siegel, supra note 120. 
164. Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of .Jwlicial Statesmanship, Xfi TEX. L. Rl v. 959, %3 
(200X); see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1%2). 
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Post notes, "the c---ourt must find a way to articulate constitutional 
law that the nation can accept as its own." 1r15 
The upshot of this perspective is that, in constitutional law, 
persuasion carries independent nonnative weight. The value of 
persuasion in constitutional law is not merely instrumental or 
practical, as it is in other domains, but is also semantic. 
Constitutional law that fails to evolve with and seek affirmation 
from the people it governs not only fails descriptively, when it 
comes to the U.S. Constitution, but is also tyrannical. 160 And so it 
counts against a constitutional proposition that the proposition is 
not persuasive. 167 To the extent there is tension between what is 
persuasive and what is "correct," it may not always be 
normatively appropriate for a constitutional decision-maker to be 
guided by the latter. Validation from the constitutional 
community is a lot (if not all) of what matters to the legitimacy of 
constitutional law. That validation happens iteratively, as judicial 
actors seek both to "reflect and regulate constitutional culture,"wi 
but its indefinite absence is the death of a constitutional claim. 
Which returns us to the question with which this Part began: 
how much should we be bothered that actors throughout the 
constitutional culture believe that substantive due process is an 
oxymoron if the belief lacks logical foundation? The answer to 
this question depends on who the actors are. Academics should of 
course interrogate the conventional wisdom of thelir subjects, and 
so constitutional law scholars and teachers should either adopt or 
explicitly reject a critique along the lines of Pan I. Most legal 
advocates arguing either in favor of or against a substantive due 
process claim should assume whatever posture is rnost helpful to 
their overall legal position. The underlying analytic integrity of 
that position is not independently relevant, though certain repeat 
players such as the Solicitor General may moderate their 
1 AS. Post, supra note 1 A2, at 11. 
1AA. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 217 (1990) (referring to a 
good judge's recognition that "their authority must he created rhetorically, in the opinion 
itself; that it depends upon the informed understanding of the reader and upon his 
acquiescence, not in the 'result' or even the 'reasoning' hy which the result is reached, hut 
in the set of relations and activities created in the opinion"). 
1A7. See Greene. supra note 157, at 1454; see also AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF 
JUSTICE 394 (2009) ("I I If others cannot, with the hest of efforts, sec that a judgment is, in 
some undcrstandahlc and reasonahle sense, just, then not only is its implementahility 
adversely affected, hut even its soundness would he deeply prohlematic.''). 
1 AX. Post, supra note I A2, at 10. 
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advocacy in the immediate case for reputational or institutional 
reasons. Although the role morality of lawyers is not without 
complexity, 16<J it is clear that legal advocates need not subjectively 
believe in the arguments they advance on clients' behalf. 170 
The more difficult question is whether different obligations 
attach to judges or other constitutional decision-makers. The 
possibility that memes distort the analytic integrity of 
constitutional law surfaces at least two potential problems for 
adjudicators, whom we will call judges for expository purposes. 
First, judges might be persuaded to make decisions that they 
would not make had they the time and inclination to interrogate 
the meme. Second, judges might themselves make use of memes 
to persuade their audiences to adopt the judges' ultimate 
conclusions. 
The first problem implicates the integrity of constitutional 
decision-making and the second the integrity of constitutional 
acceptance. Using a constitutional meme to persuade a judge as 
to a legal proposition is good lawyering. It is not clear why we 
should think about its effects differently than using any other 
rhetorical tools to persuade a judge as to the wisdom of one's 
underlying case. The risk that a judge is duped by clever lawyers 
is one the American adversarial model is committed to 
tolerating. 171 
The second problem is less familiar. Could a Supreme Court 
Justice agree with every jot and tittle of Part I of this Essay and 
still take as given and write constitutional opinions under the 
assumption that substantive due process is a contradiction in 
terms? 
On one hand, judges act analogously all the time. Primus's 
continuity tenders demonstrate that judicial decision-makers 
often write things in opinions that they know not to be correct in 
a narrow sense. Charles Black memorably defended Justice 
Black's insistence on First Amendment absolutism on the ground 
(never publicly espoused by the Justice) 172 that this is the right 
"attitude" to take towards the Bill of Rights even as one fully 
16Y. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY ( IYXX). 
170. See DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LFGAL ETHICS (200X). 
171. See J.:Ctleral/y JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN 
AMERICAN JUSTICE X0-102 ( Jl)4lJ). 
172. C( GUIDO CALAHRl:SI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF ST'ATlTES IXO-Xl 
(1YX I) (suggesting that Jus lice Black acknowktJgcJ his Jisscmhling obliquely in private). 
288 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 31:253 
appreciates the logical necessity of balancing. 173 Bickel, of course, 
was the most famous proponent of the Court's disingenuous 
invocation of procedural barriers to substantive review- in the 
name of principle, no less! 174 Constitutional adjudicators must 
respect other values in addition to and potentially in tension with 
the analytic integrity of particular propositions of constitutional 
law. Common law constitutionalism indeed presupposes that 
constitutional truth is constructed out of materials whose value 
flows from features, such as antiquity or reliance, 175 that are 
orthogonal to their "'correctness." One of those features is and 
should be the power to persuade. 
On the other hand, that concession seems to condone judicial 
dishonesty. Normally lying is a moral bad, 176 and it would be 
surprising if judges were held to lower standards than others in 
this domain. Indeed, in his blunt assessment of lawyering work as 
essentially involving lying and cheating, Daniel Markovits holds 
out the judicial function as commendably distinct. 177 David 
Shapiro has urged that judicial candor is inherent in the 
obligation, crucial to the legitimacy of judging, to give reasons: "In 
a sense, candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse 
of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, 
statutes, and precedents count for little if judges feel free to 
believe one thing about them and to say another." 17s Micah 
Schwartzman writes that an adjudicator who brings the violence 
of the state to bear upon a real-world dispute owes a moral duty 
to the litigants to give an honest assessment of his or her reasons 
for action. 179 
Scholars who defend judicial dishonesty sornetimes argue 
that the rule of law requires decisions reached on policy or 
intuitive grounds nonetheless to be articulated through legal 
171. Charl~:s L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of RiRhts, 
HARPER'S, Fch. 1961, at 63, hh. 
174. See BICKEL, supra note 1M, at 69; G~:rald Gunth~:r, The Suhtle Vices of the 
"Passive Virtues''-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, M 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (19M). 
175. See LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 13 (1940). 
176. See generallv SISSFLA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
LIFE (197k). 
177. MARKOVITS, supra note 170, at 3-4, 14-15. 
17k. David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731,737 
( 19k7). 
179. See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 9X7, 990 (200X). 
2016] MEMING OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 289 
technicalities. 1so The apparent reliance on technicalities gives a 
judicial opinion the appearance of law and can conceal political 
motivations. But at other times such references can have a nearly 
opposite effect, suggesting a lack of judicial empathy or an 
inability to appreciate the stakes of a decision. The occasional 
imperative for the Supreme Court especially to communicate in 
non-technical language might be one of the legacies of Brown v. 
Board of Education. 1s1 Brown's outsized significance surely 
results in part from an appeal to constitutional common sense, 
validated over time, as a strategy for defeating legalistic but 
myopic arguments based on text, history, and precedent. 1s2 
Any tension between the technical accuracy of a 
constitutional opinion and its public intelligibility undermines the 
case that judicial candor advances public understanding. The 
degree of identity between judicial and public understanding is an 
empirical question, and it seems obvious that perfect identity is 
not the answer. That fact, if true, is not quite fatal for someone 
like Schwartzman, who adopts a deontological stance towards the 
obligation of judicial sincerity. 1s3 Note, though, that constitutional 
law at the Supreme Court level is self-consciously not 
deontological in respect to the litigants. The Court's standards for 
certiorari disclaim any interest in "error-correction,'' instead 
searching for cases that may be used as "vehicles" to announce 
broader rules, standards, and principles for the benefit of society 
more generally .1s4 The Court, in other words, understands its job 
to treat litigants as means rather than as ends in themselves. 1s5 
1XO. See Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 155 (1YY4); 
GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP Bormrn, TRAGIC CHOICES (1Y7X). 
1X1. 347 U.S. 4X3 (1954). 
I X2. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 6Y YALE 
L.J. 421, 421 (1%0) ("Simplicity is out of fashion, and the basic scheme of reasoning on 
which these cases can he justificd is awkwardly simple."); see generally JOSEPH 
GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE CONSTITUTION: TilE SUPREME COURT'S OBLIGATION 
TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS SOMETHING WE TilE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND 
( 19Y2). 
1 X3. See Schwartzman, supra note 17Y, at YYO. 
1X4. See SUP. Cr. REV. 10 ("A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when 
thc asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or thc misapplication of a properly 
stated rule of law."); H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETIING IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT234 (1Y91) (" Anothcr commonly agreed upon criterion 
that renders a case uncertworthv is if it is a 'had vehiclc' or has 'had facts.'"). 
IX5. See IMMANUEL KAN'f', GROUNDWORK())< THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 41 
(Mary Gregor trans .. ll)l)7) ( 17X5). Something of the Court's distinctive role in announcing 
broader socictal commitmcnts lies behind Guido Calahresi's view that "[tlhc Supreme 
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I want to suggest that judicial rhetoric in constitutional cases 
should best be understood as emerging from an act of translation. 
Producing a judicial opinion involves multiple decision nodes. A 
judge reaches a legal conclusion through some mental process, the 
particulars of which are (it is important to say) irrelevant for our 
purposes. Communicating that decision to an audience of 
colleagues, litigants, lawyers, and the public involves a new set of 
choices. If the decision was reached by intuition (and in the 
unlikely event the judge is aware that it was), 1x6 the judge must 
decide whether to reveal that fact or instead to write an opinion 
that uses the tools of law to validate the hunch. If the judge 
reached the decision through the very application of such tools 
(that is, if the judge perceives herself to have done so), the judge 
still must decide whether and how to use those tools in writing the 
opinion. Persuasion makes powerful demands at this stage, and a 
conscientious judge should be aware that what persuades him or 
her might not persuade others. The judge must communicate his 
or her ideas in a distinctive register- the language, if you will, of 
constitutional rhetoric. 
Interpretive discourse has seen translation metaphors before, 
and it is important to distinguish other uses. 1x7 Lawrence Lessig 
has argued that fidelity to the Constitution requires a form of 
translation, a sensitivity both to an unchanging text and a 
changing context that can legitimate interpretive outcomes that 
differ from what original ism might superficially seem to require. 1xx 
Lessig's insight is to more fully appreciate time as a dimension of 
difference in textual meaning. Lessig's claim is consistent with the 
notion that constitutional language such as "due process of law" 
lacks the stability to make much sense of treating substantive due 
process as an inherent contradiction in terms. But like most 
constitutional theorists who have referenced translation, Lessig is 
concerned with the meanings a decision-maker attaches to a text 
he or she is charged with interpreting. My concern, instead, is with 
Court must occasionally lie; the courts hy and large should not.'' CA LABRESI, supra note 
172, at 179. 
1X6. See, e.g, Richard E. Nishett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling Afore Than We Can 
Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, X4 PSYCHO!.. REV. 231 (1977) (examining our 
inahility to discern the reasons hehind our thoughts and actions). 
I X7. For a fairly comprehensive bibliography, sec Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in 
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 116), 1171 n.J2 (1993). 
lXX. See id. 
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the way in which the decision-maker communicates that 
interpretive decision to his or her audience. 
James Boyd White's usage is closer to mine, though his 
project has a different normative center. For White, the metaphor 
of translation captures the idea that someone who writes a legal 
opinion performs a creative act that does not (because it cannot) 
simply reproduce the original text but rather is faithful both to it 
and to the reader of the translation; it is '·a way of establishing 
relations by reciprocal gesture.'' twJ A translation "'will be judged 
by its coherence, by the kinds of fidelity it establishes with the 
original, and by the ethical and cultural meaning it performs as a 
gesture of its own." 1l)0 Like a good translation, the lawgiver should 
be humble about his or her capacity for complete exposition and 
should understand the ways in which the reader's understandings 
bind the law's public expression (and therefore the law itself). 1l) 1 
A constitutional meme is a conventional form of public 
expression of constitutional law. It is not a legal fiction because its 
falsity is not generally acknowledged or even realized, either by 
author or by reader. 1l)2 But the metaphor of translation helps us to 
understand why a constitutional meme is not, then, a lie- even if 
its falsity is known by the author alone. 1l)3 As an undergraduate I 
took a course whose professor was a native French speaker. This 
professor had a habit of referring to a prospective meeting with a 
student as a rendezvous. Among French speakers, this usage is 
entirely unremarkable, as the word is best translated into English 
as "meeting. " 1l)4 Among American students, it was embarrassingly 
off-key, since in American culture the word commonly connotes 
a meeting for the specific purpose of a liaison. When this 
alternative meaning was (gingerly) brought to the professor's 
attention, he began to say "meeting," even though rendezvous 
came more naturally to his mind. We would never say the 
1k9. WHITE, supra note 166, at 256. 
190. /d. 
191. See id. at 25X. 
192. See Fuller, supra note 34, at 36X ("A fiction is generally distinguished from an 
erroneous conclusion ... by the fact that it is adopted by its author with knowledge of its 
falsity."). 
193. Cf Shapiro, supra note 17X, at 733 (suggesting overstatement in the claim that 
"everyone understands a certain amount of dissembling to be part of the adjudication 
game"). 
194. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1046 (2d coli. cd. 1991) (defining 
"rendezvous" as ''Ia! prcarranged mccting"). 
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professor was lying or even that he was being less than candid, 
even though he was not speaking his mind and even though the 
word he initially used "technically" meant exactly what he 
intended to convey. We would say instead that he was translating. 
Now consider a judge who disagrees with the Court's 
decision in Obergefell. It does not matter for our purposes what 
grounds this disagreement, whether a view that there is not 
sufficient consensus for the Court to mandate marriage equality 
through the Constitution,1l)5 that the generation that ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to extend to 
regulation of marriage in this way, 1lJ6 that extending marriage to 
same-sex couples threatens religious liberty, 1l)7 or that same-sex 
relationships are immoral or may validly be treated as such by the 
state. 1l!x Should this hypothetical dissenting judge's further 
argument that substantive due process "'distorts the constitutional 
text" 1l)l) depend on whether he or she agrees that it is a textual 
contradiction? I think not, just as advancing the argument that the 
Obergefell Court has repeated the errors of Dred Scott200 should 
not depend on whether the judge believes Dred Scott was 
erroneous. If it has become a conventional view of the law-
consuming public (including members of the legal profession and 
other professional elites who form the core of the judge's 
audience) that substantive due process is a textual distortion and 
that Dred Scott was wrong, then those propositions are part of our 
constitutional law and are therefore resources for use in 
constitutional argument. The judge who avails herself of those 
resources in the course of adjudicative exposition engages in an 
act of translation. 
1()5. See Oh~:rgefdl v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 25X4, 2611-12 (2015) (Roherts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
I%. See id. at 262X (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
I ()7. See id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
19X. See Ex parte Stat~: ex ref. Ala. Policy Inst., 1140460, 2015 Ala. LEXIS 33, 13X 
(Ala., Mar. 5, 2015) (per curiam) ("It seems at least disingenuous to find a constitutional 
infirmity with tradition<ll marriage laws hy way of a moral judgment when states have heen 
forced to defend those laws apart from any moral or rdigious hasis, an especially difficult 
task given that American ideas of marriage indisputably have heen shaped hy the Jewish 
and Christian religions."). 
FN. Oherge(e/1, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting). My usc of Justice 
Thomas's words in Ohergefi:ll should not he taken to suggest any sh:pticism that Justice 
Thomas hclievcs what he said. 
200. See Oherge(ell, 135 S. Ct. at 262l) (Roherts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Hold the rotten eggs and tomatoes until an important 
objection is addressed. My French-speaking professor began to 
use "meeting'' rather than rendezvous because he was trying 
earnestly to articulate his intended meaning to his students. He 
was not trying to communicate something that he did not believe, 
and he was not trying to persuade his students of anything. The 
usage of constitutional memes that I am offering shares the first 
feature by hypothesis. In the Obergefell hypothetical, the judge is 
trying to communicate a proposition of constitutional law that the 
judge sincerely believes: the Constitution does not require state 
recognition of same-sex marriage. The language in which he is 
doing so has no abstract meaning (as rendezvous has no abstract 
meaning); it has an acquired constitutional meaning that it is 
rhetorically useful for the judge to invoke. In so doing the judge 
is engaging the reader as a participant in exposition, as any good 
translator does.201 
And· as constitutional law requires. The line of division 
between communication and persuasion is one the epistemology 
of constitutional law does not recognize. It is widely agreed 
among constitutional scholars that propositions of constitutional 
law acquire their permanence through public acceptance.202 As 
Richard Fallon writes, ''the legal legitimacy of the Constitution 
depends much more on its present sociological acceptance (and 
thus its sociological legitimacy) than upon the (questionable) 
legality of its formal ratification. Other fundamental elements of 
the constitutional order, including practices of constitutional 
interpretation, also owe their legal legitimacy to current 
sociological acceptance. "203 If this is true, then successful rhetoric 
is a legal obligation of a constitutional judge.204 
201. Cf Fuller, supra note 34, at 3K3 ("The desire to keep the form of the law 
persuasive is frequently the impulse to preserve a form of statement which will make the 
law acceptable to those who do not have the time or the capacity for understanding reasons 
which arc not obvious-and this class sometimes includes the author of the statement 
himself."). 
202. See Bruce Ackerman, The LivinR Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007); 
Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of RecoRnition and the Constitution, KS MICH. L. REV. 621, 653 
( 19K7) (arguing that the legal authority ofjudicial precedent rests on public acceptance). 
203. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., LeRitimacy and thf Constitution, IlK HARV. L. REV. 17K7, 
1792 (2005). 
204. Whether the structure of knowledge in legal domains outside of constitutional 
law imposes similar obligations on adjudicators is beyond the scope of thi~ Essay. Cf 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (developing and defending a distinctive 
approach to legal positivism). 
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CONCLUSION 
Constitutional memes are entrenched-indeed, are self-
reinforcing- but they are not permanent. It was once hornbook 
law that rights could be divided into distinct civil, political, or 
social rights.205 We no longer think of rights in those terms, and 
the categories were overlapping and internally inconsistent even 
during Reconstruction, the heyday of the tripartite scheme. 206 This 
change in legal understanding did not occur because of an 
intervening constitutional amendment, Supreme Court decision, 
or other change in substantive constitutional law. 'What changed 
was the conventional public expression of rights, as the language 
of rights increasingly came to represent an aspiration towards 
universal moral equality. Substantive due process might not 
always be thought incompatible with the constitutional text, and 
indeed this Essay can be understood, in part, as a step towards 
that end. 
That said, the Essay is itself a paradox. It seeks to expose 
fallacies in the textual argument against substantive due process 
but it is neither a defense of substantive due process as a 
constitutional doctrine nor even a criticism of the textual 
argument. The way to square this circle is to understand the Essay 
as a kind of defense of fallacies. Constructing and relying upon 
constitutional memes that serve one's rhetorical purposes is part 
of what it means to advance arguments in the real world that 
constitutional law regulates. Scholars can and shoUlld deconstruct 
old ideas, but judges may be forgiven if they haven't the time. 
205. See RICHARD A. PRIMUS, TilE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGIITS 154 (1999). 
206. See id. 
